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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the legal 
consequences of the birth of a child whose parents have taken 
contraceptive precautions. Contraception will be regarded as 
including not only short-term measures such as the contraceptive 
pill or physical protectives, but will also extend to the long 
term permanent measures of male and female sterilisation. 
Where the parents have used contraception it is clear 
that the birth of a child is the very event they wished to 
prevent. They will now be unwillingly confronted with the 
economic and social pressures attendant upon the birth and 
upbringing of a child. Pressures which may be aggravated by 
their circumstances and which may well affect other members of 
their existing family. This paper will therefore centre around 
the question whether the birth of an unwanted child can cause 
a loss or damage entitling the parents and their family to 
compensation. 
If there were entitlement to compensation for the 
birth of an unwanted child it will obviously have to be 
considered who should be liable for payment. In the New Zealand 
context there would appear to be two possible alternatives. The 
first is spreading the loss over society under the Accident 
Compensation Act 1972. The second is to make the producer of 
the contraceptive or surgeon who performed the sterilisation 
operation liable under common law. 
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Since coverage under the Accident Compensation Act is 
an absolute defence to a common law action(l)the nature of the 
question as to liability is somewhat vexed and is not a matter 
of choice so much as one of definition. Moreover, as it will 
later appear, resolution of this question will have considerable 
repercussions on assessment of compensation. 
THE UNWANTED CHILD - CAN HIS BIRTH CAUSE A COMPENSATABLE LOSS? 
The Courts have developed an irrebuttable presumption 
that the birth of a child, in the context of marriage at least, 
( 2) 
confers a benefit upon both the parents and society as a whole. 
The fact that the parents hoped to avoid the birth has been 
regarded as irrelevant. Moreover, so great has been the moment 
ascribed to the birth of a child by the Courts that the avoidance 
of the benefit of birth by means of contraception has been 
regarded as contrary to public policy. 
Thus in a comparatively recent unanimous decision of the 
English Court of Appeal it was held that a marriage may be annulled 
for non-consumation where, by the use of a contraceptive, a spouse-
"deliberately discontinues the act of intercourse before it 
has reached its natural termination or when he artificially 
prevents that natural termination which is the passage of 
the male seed into the body of the woman. To hold otherwise 
would be to affirm that a marriage is consumated by an act 
so performed that one of the principal aims if not the 
principal end of marriage is intentionally frustrated." 
( 4) 
( 3) 
In a subsequent decision of the same Court the above rule was 
applied in an action for annulment where the husband had been 
sterilised. Thus it was not - so much. the "passage of the male 
seed" as the unnaturally induced sterility which was advanced as 
(1) Accident Compensation Act 1972; preamble; binding as per 
s.5(e) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924. 
(2) cf Ball v. Mudge(l964) 64 Wash , 2d 247, 391, p.2d 201,204 
Shaheen v. Knight (1957) 11 pa D& C 2d 4,43 Lycoming County 
(3) Cowen v. Cowen (1946) P.36,40, (1945) 2 All E.R.197,199 
(4) J. v. J. (1947) P 158 (1947) 2 All E.R. 43,44 
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the key ·factor to annulment. The birth control policy question 
( 5) 
arose again, most recently, in another decision of the same Court. 
In that case a husband had a vascectomy operation to spite his 
wife who sought a divorce on grounds of cruelty. The Court 
refused to grant the divorce and the majority saw no need to 
refer to J. & J. (supra). It was, however, cited with resounding 
approval in the minority judgment of Lord Denning M.R. from which 
the other members of the Court expressly dissociated themselves. 
Whilst the majorities' distinction of J.v.J. in Bravery 
may indicate a significant change in judicial attitudes the two 
cases can easily be distguished in that Bravery was an action for 
divorce while J.v.J. was an action for annulment. Moreover the 
minority judgment of Lord Denning M.R.would appear to indicate 
that there remains a formidable judicial opinion that contracept-
ion is contrary to public policy. 
It can only be concluded that the law remains uncertain 
and it would appear that at most the decision in Bravery has done 
little more than cast doubt upon the principle that contraception 
is contrary to public policy. The policy reasons for this 
principle are implied rather than judically expressed, but it 
is suggested that they are:-
(1) That to endorse the use of contraception would be 
to open the flood gates to immorality both within 
and outside marriage. 
(2) That it is in the interests of the public not to 
discourage procreation by endorsing contraception, 
so as to maintain the population. 
(5) Bravery v. Bravery (1954) 3 All ER 59, 67.68 
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It is submitted that due to changes in society neither 
of the above policy limbs can be supported, and social and 
governmental attitudes are now quite different from those 
reflected in the judgments which have given rise to the rule 
against contraception. 
The New Zealand Government Department of Health esti-
mates that:-
"***almost half the women of reproductive age in New Zealand 
use the pill. 11 ( 6 ) 
In the Department's estimation tens of thousands of other contra-
ceptives are used yearly in New Zealand, and the consumption is 
growing. ( 7 ) The Department also has figures which indicate 
that the number of male and female sterilisation operations is 
( 8) 
rapidly increasing. It should be noted that these figures 
do not include the physical methods of contraception such as 
withdrawal or the rhythm method. 
It is clear that the upsurge in use of contraception 
has done nothing to reduce the population of New Zealand, which 
continues to grow. Moreover in light of world over-population 
it would seem to be to our advantage to artifically limit popula-
tion growth. Thus there remains only the question of immorality. 
Were the Courts to enforce this policy limb of the rule against 
contraception they would be in the position of condemning a 
considerable proportion of the population of New Zealand. While 
quantity alone does not dispose of the qualitative moral argument 
it is submitted that this factor together with present Government 
policy does extinguish the morality objection. 
( 6) 
( 7) 
( 8) 
Department of Health submissions on contraception and 
sterilisation to the Royal Commission on Contraception 
Sterilisation and Abortion para. 5.3 page 10. 
Ibid. para. 5.3 page 9 
Ibid. para. 8.7 page 17 
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In its submissions to the Royal Commission on 
Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion the Health Department 
noted that:-
"There is ample evidence that family planning is conducive 
to the health of not only the mother of the family but of 
all the members of her family and that, therefore, family 
planning is an aspect of public health in which the 
Department is legitimately interested. 11 ( 9 ) 
Later in the same submissions it was also noted that:-
''In the past decade family planning has become accepted as 
a public health measure and an integral part of a modern 
health service. It is supported by the New Zealand Government 
which annually spends a considerable sum both in New Zealand 
and overseas upon it." (lO) 
Government involvement does not however extend as far 
as providing contraception in the same way as prescription drugs. 
All contraceptive devices, including the pill which is only avail-
able by prescription, are unsubsidised and must be paid for by 
the user. Application may however be made on the basis of economic , 
hardship for the provision of contraception without any cost to 
the user. (ll) Although since this policy was introduced in 1971 
only 362 such applications have been made. (l 2 ) 
Under the present system sterilisation operations may be 
(13) 
performed without cost to the patient in public hospitals. 
However the actual situation is effectively the same as that for 
short-term contraception. Since due to the low priority given 
to sterilisation operations in public hospitals the majority are 
performed in private hospitals and are paid for by the patient. 
(9) Ibid note 6 para. 2.2 page 1 
(lO)Ibid para 2.6 page 2 
(ll)Health Department Clinical Services News Letter No.139 dated 
19th July 1974 
(12)Ibid note 6 para. 7.5 page 13. 
(13)Ibid para 8.6 page 16 
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Effectively, then, at the presE=irt time all that is 
really provided free is advice, either by Department clinics 
and publications or through the New Zealand Family Planning 
Association. The Family Planning Association at present plays 
the major role. It is however beset by financial problems which 
Department subsidies are inadequate to cover. 
Notwithstanding the present situation the Maternity 
Services Committee of the Board of Health has recorrunended that: 
"The most suitable method of birth control including 
surgical methods should be readily available free to 
all who need it."(l 4 ) 
It is to be hoped that the above recommendation will 
be adopted by Government. What can be concluded from the status 
quo and future policy recorrunendations is that there is no longer 
any factual basis on which to justify preserving the rule 
against contraception. Despite the fact that it now appears 
that avoidance of the benefit of the birth of a child is no 
longer contrary to public policy such a conclusion does not 
absolutely extinguish the benefit rule. Any such assertion 
could not be factually justified since the birth of ·a child is 
still actively sought by many persons in New Zealand. Moreover 
to adopt a fundamentally hostile attitude to the birth of a 
(15) 
human being is necessarily repugnant. The benefit rule must 
remain with us. It is submitted however that the redundance of 
the rule against contraception may now raise the possibility of 
displacing the absolute effect of the presumption of benefit by 
th f . ( 16) e use o contraception. 
(14). Ibid para 2.7 page 3 
(15). Gleitman v. Cosgrove (1967) 49N.J.22,29,227A 2d 689,693, 
22 A.L.R. 3d 1411 
(16). This approach was adopted in Troppi v.Scarf (1971) 187 NW 
2d 511, 317: 
Jackson v.Anderson (1970) 230 S02d 503 
Custodio v. Bauer(l967) 251 Cal.App 2d 303,325,59 Cal. 
Rptr. 463, 27ALR 3d 884 
Bishop v. Byrne (1967) 265 F. Supp. 460 
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It is not suggested that the mere fact of contrary 
intention is sufficient to displace the benefit rule, other 
factors must be taken into account. It could not be disputed 
that the birth of a child inevitably involves the parents in 
(17) 
economic and sometimes social loss. On the other hand it 
is equally indisputable that the birth of a child inevitably 
confers a benefit upon the parents in terms of: -
"the joy and affection which they will have in rearing 
and educating***" 
their children. (l 8) In order to enable the parents to enjoy the 
benefit it is necessary to equalise the loss, thus the positive 
factors of the birth must be weighed against the negative factors 
of the economic loss. It has been suggested that this will 
involve placing a dollar value on the positive elements of the 
birth which is totally repugnant. (l 9 ) It is submitted that this 
is not the case, although even if it were such an exercise should 
be no more repugnant than assessing loss of enjoyment of life 
under S.120 of the Accident Compensation Act 1972. It is suggest-
ed that it is not necessary to quantify the benefit in the same 
way as the economic loss since the purpose of the assessment 
must be to compare the effects of each factor, not simply to measure 
them on the same yardstick. 
Such an approach would enable the assessment o f 
compensation on all the merits of any given case rather than on 
an arbitrary fixed basis. Thus, where for example, the purpose 
of contraception was simply to postpone an intended family the 
(17) This is clearly evidenced by Family Benefit payments under 
the Social Security Act and the Court's power to award maint-
enance of children under the Matrimonial Proceedings Act. 
(18) Shaheen v. Knight ibid note 2, at 521 
(19) Ibid ngte 18 and Ibid note 16 Troppi v.Scarf at 518 where sucfi o Jection was rejected. 
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(20) 
loss would be minimal and the compensation should be proportional. 
However this approach does not mean that there would be no 
entitlement to compensation if the parents could afford to 
bring up the child since the birth would result in money which 
was to have been directed to other purposes being expended on 
the new arrival; the loss would simply take a different form. 
It is submitted that compensation must be primarily aimed at 
replenishing:-
"*** the family exchequer so that the new arrival will 
not deprive the other members of the family of what 
was planned as their just share of the family income ... ( 2 l) 
It must also be pointed out as an additional facet 
to compensation that it should not be confined to economic loss. 
The mother should be able to recover for the pain involved in 
giving birth to a child. (22 ) She should also be able to 
recover for lost educational and social opportunities. Where the 
spouses are married there should also be recovery for loss of 
conjugal rights. ( 23 ) 
It should not be supposed that the ramifications 
of the benefit rule are confined to compensation, in fact the 
retention of the benefit rule is something of a two-edged sword. 
Since the birth of a child is always a benefit it is not open to 
remedy the attendant economic loss by depriving the parents the 
benefit of their child by abortion or adoption. ( 24 ) To do so 
would not only be morally unjustifiable but also contrary to 
public policy. 
(20) Ibid Troppi v.Scarf at 818 
(21) Custodio v.Bauer 59 Cal Rptr 463, 467 
(22) Ibid note 16; Troppi v.Scarf at 818 Bishop v.Byrne at 464 
(23) West v. Underwood (1945) 132 N.J.L.325 40 A. 2d 610 
(24) Ibid note 16 Troppi v.Scarf at 521 
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On the other hand the benefit rule must deprive the 
(25) 
child himself from recovering compensation for "wrongful life." 
If there is recovery it is clear that it must be initially by the 
parents or the parents and their family who suffer the immediate 
economic loss. However if the child were born unhealthy the 
situation would be quite different. If the child were injured in 
(26) 
utero by a defective contraceptive he should recover compensation. 
There should also be recovery, it is submitted, where the child 
is born with a hereditary defect which the parents endeavoured to 
prevent by their use of contraception. 
It is submitted that changing Governmental and 
social attitudes to the legitimacy of contraception also have 
ramifications beyond the immediate effect of the benefit rule. 
The parents' intercourse could not be regarded as an intervening 
event on a "but for" analysis since the use of, and hence 
reliance on, contraception is now not only regarded as socially 
legitimate but is also encouraged by Government so that the 
unsuccessful contraceptive is not only the last but also the 
sole wrong doer. 
By the same token it is submitted that the parents' 
marital status should not be relevant( 27 )since all persons over 
sixteen years who have sexual intercourse are encouraged to use 
contraception. It is suggested that this will not involve any 
real change in judicial attitudes to extra-marital sex, which can 
be reconciled with existing Government policy. The decision to 
use contraception of necessity occurs subsequent to the decision 
to have sexual intercourse. Thus the use by purchase of contra-
(25) Ibid note 15 Gleitman v. Cosgrove 
(26) Watt v. Rama (1972) V.R. 353 
(27) Ibid note 16 Troppi v. Scarf 518 where in dicta marital 
status was regarded as irrelevant. 
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ception is not void as an immoral contract since its purpose 
is to prevent pregnancy not to encourage sex. 
At this point it is relevant to point out that 
before any loss could be assessed it would have to be shown 
that the pregnancy was in fact unwanted, and that bona fide 
steps were taken to avoid it. In many cases this would be 
difficult, not to say impossible, since most contraceptives 
are destroyed during or immediately after use. Moreover there 
are unlikely to be any witnesses to confirm that such measures 
were taken. This limitation must, of necessity, curtail many 
possible recoveries. 
It is submitted, however, that such a limitation 
must be imposed by practicality since the only logical alter-
native would be to award compensation whenever it could be 
shown that the birth of a child has caused an economic loss. 
Such an approach is clearly undesirable since it would thwart 
the Government's policy to encourage contraception by providing 
a positive dis-incentive to use it. 
WHO SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR THE LOSS? 
(1). The Accident Compensation Act 1972 
Since it is Government policy to encourage family 
planning it does not seem unreasonable that the Government, by 
the Accident Compensation Act 1972, should provide the immediate 
source of recovery where contraception has failed. Consistent 
with the above indication that some limitation on recovery is 
necessary it would appear that the requirement of'personal injury 
by ·accident' to qualify for coverage under the Accident 
Compensation Act should perform this function. 
To gain entitlement under the Act, it will therefore 
:c 
D 
m 
Ci) 
n 
• 
cp 
• 
Ci) 
• 
8 :., 
~ a 
8 
~ ...... 
0 :, 
-11-
be necessary to show that either, or both, the unwilling mother or 
the unwanted child has suffered personal injury by accident. 
'Personal injury by accident' is defined to include: 
(i) The physical and mental consequences of any 
such injury or of the accident; 
(ii) "Medical *** misadventure." (28 ) 
Where a child is born healthy it is clear that his birth 
could not be regarded as a personal injury or even an accident. 
However, where the child is born unhealthy it is worth exploring 
the possibility of his recovery since the Accident Compensation 
( 2 9) 
Commission has recognised the entitlement of the unborn child. 
It would appear that there is coverage where the child is 
injured by a defective contraceptive method. For example a 
dislodged inter-uterine device becoming embedded in the foetus or 
a chemical contraceptive causing deformation. ( 30) It is submitted 
that the resultant physical defects are injuries in the same sense 
as a non-ideopathic illness in that they are caused by factors 
( 31) 
external to the subject. Similarly it is submitted that proof of 
the external cause raises an inference that the injury was the 
result of an accident despite the fact that the actual moment of 
injury is not identifiable. 
Where, however,a child is born with some hereditary 
defect or illness which the parents endeavoured to prevent by 
taking contraceptive precautions it may be that the situation vis a 
vis the act is different. It is difficult to see how an ideopathic 
illness could be regarded as an injury since it is not caused by an 
event external to the subject. It could however be argued that the 
(28) s.2 (1) (a) Accident Compensation Act 1972 as amended by the 
Accident Compensation Amendment Act 1974. 
(29) ACC Report May 1976 page 17 containing an express approval of 
Watt v. Rama ibid note 26. 
(30) c.f. the Thalidomide cases;_§_ v.Distillers Co.Ltd. (1969)3 All 
ER 1412 Allen v. Distillers Co. Ltd. (1974) Q.B. 384 
(31) Storey v. Wellington Hospital Board (1932) NZLR 1553 (CA) 
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failure of the contraceptive method which caused the pregnancy 
is in fact an accident. 
Proceeding on the assumption that contraceptive 
failure could be regarded as an accident it is arguable that 
the use of the word "or" in s.2(1)a(i) (J 2 )is disjunctive and 
allows cover for the physical consequences of an accident with-
out proof of attendant "personal injury." It is however 
difficult to reconcile this argument with the use of the word 
"the" prefacing "accident" which would appear to be referential 
to "injury." Such an interpretation would also render the 
qualifying phrase of 'personal injury by accident' at least 
partially redundant. It is unlikely that the Commission would 
be willing to extend entitlement to the extent that above 
interpretation would warrant. Therefore it appears that a 
child born with an hereditary defect is unlikely to have cover 
under the Act where his birth is due to unsuccessful contraception. 
Thus where the child is born uninjured we must turn 
to the mother. Where she is injured by the physical and mental 
circumstances of giving birth it is by no means clear that there 
is recovery. Since while the actual pregnancy may well be 
regarded as an accident the personal injury caused by the result-
ant birth occurs some nine months later. It is submitted that the 
time delay need not prevent recovery since there is no express 
requirement in the Act that the accide_nt ahdinjury should be 
simultaneous, only that they should be causally connected. The 
situation is different where the mother is injured by the 
medical treatment given to her on birth of the child since 
( 3 3) 
it is clear there is recovery under s.2 (1) a (ii) of the Act 
( 3 2) c . f . note 2 8 
(33) ibid. 
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but this has nothing to do with the unwanted nature of the 
birth. 
Generally apart from the immediate physical pain and 
suffering attendant upon the birth the mother is left without 
any lasting mental or physical injury. As was submitted above 
where pregnancy can be shown to have been caused by contraceptive 
failure the 'accident' requirement is satisfied. The question is 
therefore whether pregnancy may be regarded as personal injury. 
S.105 B includes pregnancy in its definition of 'actual bodily 
harm' for the purposes of s.2, but such pregnancy must be caused 
either by rape or sex with a child under 12 years. 
Act provides no immediate entitlement. 
Therefore the 
It may be that this anomally could be avoided under the 
head of 'medical misadventure.' For example where in the case 
of female sterilisation the fallopian tubes are not entirely 
severed or the wrong tube is severed. The problem with this 
approach is that it is the medical omission of not properly 
cutting the relevant tubes that has caused the pregnancy not 
any positive Act. Thus pregnancy is not a consequence of the 
treatment given, but the treatment not given. In a recent 
Accident Compensation Commission review decision( 34 ) (which is 
subject to appeal) it was said in dicta -
"*** that in some circumstances a 'medical omission,' 
where in diagnosis or treatment may lead to a situation 
properly described as 'medical misadventure' for the 
purposes of the Act, ***" 
These circumstances were said probably to comprise -
II*** an omission in either diagnosis or treatment (which) 
may so 'taint' the treatment actually given as to render 
such treatment inadequate***" 
(34) ACC Report January 1976 19,20 
• 
Q) 
• 
Ci) 
• 
--
[ BR~ Y 
-14-
It is clear that an unsuccessful sterilisation operation is 
just such a circumstance. The relevant test was formulated as -
"*** the death, the injury, on the aggravation of the 
injury on which the claim is founded, must be attributed 
to, caused by, and be a direct result of the medical 
conduct complained of, on the mishap that occurred." 
As indicated above, pregnancy is not an injury in 
terms of the Act but the wording of s.2 equates "medical 
misadventure" with 'personal injury by accident,' so that it 
is enough that pregnancy is a 'consequence' of it. However, 
as indicated in the above quotation, it would appear that the 
Commission interprets s.2 as 'personal injury caused by 
medical misadventure' so that the term 'medical misadventure' 
goes to the requirement of an 'accident' alone. It therefore 
appears that the medical misadventure is not in itself a 
'personal injury.' Whilst it could be argued that cutting 
the wrong tube or incompletely cutting the right one, is in 
fact an injury as well as an accident, the point remains that 
pregnancy is not a 'physical consequence of the positive acts 
that lead to these personal injuries by accident, but of the 
omission in incompletely or not, severing the fallopian tubes. 
Thus while it appears that medical omission in this case may 
well constitute an accident there is no relevant attendant 
injury, the consequence of which is pregnancy. As indicated 
above in the case of a child born with a hereditary defect it 
is unlikely that there will be recovery regarding pregnancy as 
a consequence of an accident alone, in the absence of attendant 
personal injury. 
Where the child is born as a result of an unsuccessful 
vascectomy operation, quite apart from the above, recovery is 
even more fundamentally prevented since while the vascectomy may 
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be regarded as a medical misadventure by omission where it is 
unsuccessful, the physical consequences of the accident affect 
someone other than the male subject. 
Similarly where a child is born because of wrongfully 
prescribed contraceptives, or contraceptives which are defective 
(35) 
in either supply or manufacture there is unlikely to be 
recovery where both mother and child remain healthy. This is 
especially the case where contraceptives are bought from a 
vending machine or across the counter which are unlikely to be 
regarded as a medical treatment since they are produced for 
consumption without any particular person in mind. Moreover in 
both these cases there is clearly no personal injury even 
remotely attendant to their accidental failure. 
It is therefore concluded that entitlement under 
the Act will be confined to those cases where externally caused 
injury can be proved and where the unwanted nature of the preg-
nancy is irrelevant. Even supposing there were entitlement, 
for example, under the head of 'medical misadventure' it would 
appear to be very limited. It would appear that the mother could 
recover her medical expenses under s.111, she could also, perhaps, 
recover for pain and suffering caused by her pregnancy under 
s.120. Where the mother is married it may be that her family 
could recover for 'quantifiable loss of service' under s.121 (2) (a) J 
However the best part of what may be recoverable would 
be dependent upon proved 'incapacity' caused by the birth on the 
part of the mother. S.2 of the Act defines incapacity as -
"Total or partial incapacity." 
The three sections of the Act directly concerning incapacity 
ss. 113, 114 and 118 are all framed in terms of physical incapacity 
(35) c.f. Troppi (supra) where tranquilisers were supplied 
instead of the pill. 
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and it is unlikely that their ambit could be extended to include 
economic incapacity. 
As indicated in the introduction coverage under 
(36) 
the Act is an absolute defence to a common law action. 
Because of the paucity of compensation available to an uninjured 
mother or child the question of definition assumes major proport-
ions. It is clear that the Accident Compensation Act would 
yield less by way of compensation than a common law action, 
but this is strictly irrelevant. It is submitted however that 
in policy terms the disparity of each potential recovery should 
militate against a wide interpretation of the Act. 
(2). Recovery under Common Law 
Where both mother and child are left uninjured 
from the circumstances of pregnancy and birth it would seem there 
is no recovery under the Accident Compensation Act. The alter-
native solution lies in the common law. It is submitted that 
generally the relevant facts would enable actions to be brought 
in both contract and tort. However it would appear that the 
substantive differences in each plea, quite apart from the merits 
of any given case, would play a large part in the outcome of an 
action. It is worth considering and evaluating these differences. 
The basic requirement of an action in contract is 
consideration moving from the promisee. As indicated above, it 
has been recommended that Government extend its role in family 
planning towards providing gratuitous contraception, and to some 
(36) Ibid. note 1 
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extent this is already the case. Thus in the absence of 
consideration the role of contract law will be of diminishing 
importance. 
Moreover an action in contract is also subject 
to the limitation of privity. Thus the only relevant damage 
or injury is confined to that of the contracting party who 
paid for the contraceptive service who, in many cases, is not 
the mother who suffers the initial damage. It may be that 
this limitation could be avoided by regarding the purchaser 
as the agent of the user or patient. Although such an approach 
would probably be confined to the marital situation where it 
would be reinforced by the fact that the purchaser would at 
least share in the economic loss caused by the unwanted birth. 
It is submitted that such an e x tension of the agency rule in 
the marital context at least, is quite reasonable having regard 
to the single legal identity spouses can, on many occasions, 
assume. It does not, however, do much to assist the unmarried 
mother. 
The assessment of damages in each branch of the 
law proceeds on the basic concept of "restituo in integrum." 
With the difference that the purpose of an award of damages in 
tort is to return the plaintiff as close as possible to the 
( 3 7) 
position he would have occupied had the tort never been committed. 
While in contract their purpose is to return the plaintiff to 
the position he would have occupied had the contract been 
( 3 8) 
performed properly. 
(37) Fleming on Torts 4th Edition 202, 207. 
(38) Hall v. Pim (1927) All E.R. Rep. 226 
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It could thus be argued that the benefit rule could 
be circumvented in contract since the relevant consideration is 
defining the breach rather than defining the injury. Such an 
approach would, however, ignore the problem of assessment of 
damages since even were a contract breached damages could 
hardly be awarded where the breach conferred a benefit upon 
the aggrieved party. It is clear that the benefit rule will 
have universal application. 
There is also an additional facet to the assessment 
of damage in each cause of action and that is remoteness of 
damage. It is submitted that an argument that the economic loss 
consequential upon an unwanted birth is too remote in tort could 
not be reconciled with the large awards that the Courts have 
made to the supporting relatives of an injured party for nursing 
( 3 9) 
expenses. It is submitted that there is no real ground for 
distinction since an award in each situation rests on the 
responsibility of the relatives for an expense immediately and 
irretrievably consequent upon the event in point. It would 
appear that it is the element of responsibility which distinguish-
es the situation of the unwanted child from other economic loss 
( 4 0) 
cases. 
The situation may however be quite different in 
contract where for the purposes of assessing damages for breach 
( 41) 
the degree of nreseeability required is higher than in tort. 
It could not reasonably be argued that the possibility of pregnancy 
from contraceptive failure is not within the strictest test of 
foreseeability but the attendant economic loss may well be regarded 
(39) Ibid note 30; the Thalidomide cases, of also: 
Taylor v. Bristol Omnibus Co. Ltd. (1975) 2 All E.R. 1107 
Hagar v. De Placideo 116 S.J. 396 
(40) e.g. Kirkham v. Baughey (1958) 2 QB 338 
Spartan Steel v. Martin & Co. (1973) QB 27 
(41) The Heron II (1969) 1 AC 350 
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as a far more serious damage than would have been contemplated. 
It has been held that where the kind of loss is within the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties the fact that its extent 
(42) 
is far more serious than contemplated is irrelevant. Such an 
approach is however somewhat difficult to reconcile with the 
( 4 3) 
leading authority in the area of damages in contract, where 
no such distinction was drawn. Either approach could be argued 
so that it is by no means clear that the measure of damages in 
contract will be as fruitful as that in tort. 
As indicated the assessment of damages in contract 
is dependent upon proof of breach, the definition of which must 
depend upon identification of the terms of the contract. It is 
clear that every contraceptive method is subject to some unavoid-
(44) 
able failure rate. Thus the supplier or surgeon could not 
practically be regarded as warranting absolute protection. There-
fore the advantage of strict liability in contract is considerably 
eroded and the supplier or surgeon can only be regarded as provid-
ing a reasonably safe contraceptive method. The merging of the 
contractual plea into tort will also be seen as imposed by the 
natures of the contraceptive methods. An analysis of which will 
also underline the difficulties of proof, in that it will not 
only be necessary to show that contraceptive precautions were 
taken as it would have been for the Accident Compensation Act, 
but also that the method used was itself defective. 
Recovery for failure of Supplied Contraceptives 
Where the defective contraceptive is bought across 
the counter or from a vending machine, or where it is correctly 
(42) Vacwell Engineering v.B.D.H.Chemicals Ltd. (1971) 1 Q.B. 111 
Wroth v. Tyler (1973) 1 AllE.R. 847; and to a certain extent 
per the English Court of Appeal in Harbutt's Plasticine v. 
Wayne Tank & Pump Co. Ltd. (1970) 1 Q.B.447, 466 
(43) The Heron II (1969) 1 AC 350 H.L. see also .Victoria Laundry 
(Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (1949) 2 K.B. 528 CA 
(44) Ibid note 6 para 5.2 page 7 c.f.also Obstetrical and 
Gynaecological Survey Vol. 39 Nov. 1974 980 
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( 4 5) 
prescribed but defective in supply, the situation can be 
described as a sale of goods. Typifying this kind of transaction 
is the absence of any written contract of sale. It is submitted 
hat an action in contract may be brought under the Sale of Goods 
Act 1908 and under the head of "producer liability" in tort. 
Section 16 of the Sale of Goods Act provides for 
"implied conditions as to quality or fitness" where the goods 
are bought either by description or the purpose for which they 
are required is made known to the vendor. It is suggested that 
either or both these requirements would be met in the present 
situation either expressly or by implication. 
Moreover by virtue of Section 55 special damages 
may be recovered so that: 
"*** if a buyer suffers personal injury through use of 
defective goods he can claim damages from the seller 
under the implied terms of the Sale of Goods Act despite 
the fact that the seller has not been guilty of any 
( 4 6) 
negligence." 
It is submitted that the phrase 'personal injury' 
can and should be extended to the economic and other losses 
attendant upon the birth of an unwanted child. Thus it would 
appear that in the sale of goods situation an action in contract 
might have the advantage of strict contractual liability without 
any express limitation of the range of damages. Nevertheless as 
indicated above a warranty of absolute protection cannot by 
statistical necessity be reasonably implied. The standard must 
be that of a reasonably safe contraceptive. A plea in contract 
(45) Ibid note 16 of Troppi v.Scarf where the chemist negligently 
supplied tranquiliser instead of the pill. 
(46) Atiyah; Sale of Goods 1973 Edn. 107 
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might still however allow of an advantage in that all that need 
be shown is that the contraceptive used was not reasonably safe 
( 4 7) 
whilst negligence must still be proved in tort. It is submitt-
ed that this distinction no longer has any real importance and it 
should be remembered that it is in the purchase of physical 
protectives and the like, across the counter that the doctrine 
of privity is likely to make its largest inroads. 
In America, manufacturer's liability is generally 
strict in the field of food and drugs and products dangerous to 
( 4 8) 
the consumer. In our jurisdiction the maxim of "Res ipsa 
( 4 9) 
loquitur" which has applied in this area of the law since 1936 
has now been developed far enough to allow the Australian High 
Court to say that: 
"*** the care necessary approximates and almost becomes 
strict liability." ( 50) 
It is suggested that because of the high degree of reliance 
placed on the safety of contraceptives and the catastrophic 
results of their failure they could be regarded as being equiva-
lent to "inherently dangerous chattels" and if this is the case 
the standard required of the manufacturer would be such as to: 
"require practically a guarantee of safety." (51) 
It is submitted that there is no real advantage to 
be gained in suing in contract alone especially in terms of 
privity and the range of damages. There may however still be 
room for a stricter contractual standard and it would appear to 
( 5 2) 
be wise to bring a joint action. 
(47) Daniels v.White & Sons (1938) 4 All E.R. 288 
(48) The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act 21 U.S.C.A. s.301 et seq.and 
s.402A Rest.2nd. 
(49) Grant v.Australian Knitting Mills (1936) A.C.85 101 see also 
Mason v.Williams & Williams Ltd. (1955)1 All E.R.808,910 
(50) Shandloff v.City Dairy (1936) 4 D.L.R. 712,719 
(51) Holinaty v.Hawkins (1965) 52 D.L.R. 2d. 289 
(52) e.g. Parker v. Oloxo Ltd. (1937) 2 All E.R. 524 
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The real problem with unsuccessful physical 
contraceptives is proof. Because there is unavoidable failure 
rate the plaintiff will need to rebutt the obvious preseumption 
that the pregnancy was within the failure tolerance of the 
contraceptive used. The plaintiff will therefore be required 
to adduce affirmative proof or to proceed on an admission. Such 
proof will of course be very difficult since not only will it be 
necessary to show that the contraceptive was in fact used and 
used properly but also that the particular contraceptive used 
was defective. 
Thus, because of the problem of proof it seems very 
unlikely that there could be recovery where condams or diaphagrams 
or spermicidal foams are used. The same problem would also seem 
to extend to the contraceptive pill although if it could be 
( 5 3) 
shown that the wrong drug was supplied it is submitted that 
the presumption of tolerable failure is extinguished by a counter 
presumption that the medication supplied is totally inadequate 
for the use for which it was required. Similarly where an inter-
uterive device is used which is defective in manufacture it is 
suggested that the defective manufacture also raises a counter-
presumption extinguishing the presumption of tolerable failure. 
Since an I.U.D. must be inserted by an expert third party the 
initial difficulty of proof may be avoided. Although it should 
be noted that both the contraceptive pill and the I.U.D. form 
something of a grey area where producer's liability and profess-
ional negligence might intersect since it would clearly be a 
defence for the manufacturer to show that the fault was that of 
the doctor involved. 
(53) As it was in Troppi v.Scarf c.f. note 45 
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Recovery for failure of surgical contraceptive precautions 
Where the contraceptive method is obtained by 
securing professional services which are defective a contractual 
analysis would appear to be of little assistance. Apart from 
the very unlikely possibility that the surgeon might expressly 
warrant his services at very most the standard required could be 
that in the recent English Court of Appeal decision in Greaves v. 
(54) 
Baynham Meikle. In that case it was held that the contractual 
standard for the professional service provided that it 
"*** should be reasonably fit for the purpose for which 
it was required." (55 ) 
The case concerned the negligence of an engineering 
firm which contracted to design a warehouse. The entire Court 
was at pains to emphasise that the standard required of a 
professional man is the same in contract as it is in tort so that 
"The law does not usually imply a warranty that he will 
achieve the desired result but only a term that he will 
use reasonable care and skill. The surgeon does not 
warrant that he will cure the patient." (56 ) 
Thus the universally relevant standard is that of tort. It is 
submitted, however, that by using the maxim of "Res ipsa Loquitur' 
the plaintiff is entitled to say by analogy; 
"I want into hospital to be cured of two stiff fingers. 
I have come out with four stiff fingers and my hand is 
useless. That should not have happened if due care had 
been used. Explain it if you can." ( 57 ) 
This does not mean that the mere fact of an unwant-
ed pregnancy could raise the maxim since statistical evidence 
points to an unavoidable failure rate. It is however suggested thai 
(54) 
(55) 
( 5 6) 
( 5 7) 
(1975) 3 All ER 99 
Ibid at 102 
Ibid at 103 per Denning M.R. 
Per the then Denning L.J. in Cassidy v.M.O.H. (1951) 2 KB 
343, 365 
v,ctor\a u~ t 
Wellington 
Law Ubrefy 
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an obvious irregularity in treatment such as an incompletely 
or unsevered fallopian tube should raise a presumption of 
negligence. 
The physician could rebutt the presumption by 
showing: 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
That the supposed irregularity is in fact the result of 
causes beyond the physician's control such as natural 
regrowth of the severed tubes. 
That he conformed to existing medical standards in that 
proof of subsequent developments showing the practice 
adopted to be below the required standard of care is 
irrelevant. ( 5 B) 
That the error on the part of the physician was "an 
acceptable error of judgment" and not sufficiently gross 
to be classified as negligent. ( 59 ) 
That he conformed to the standard that would have been 
adopted by the majority of his profession. (60) 
Whilst the first two defences are acceptable 
limitations to the plaintiff's right of action real difficulties 
can arise with the latter two. Where acceptable error is 
pleaded it could be argued that as defence it has wide application 
since confusion can easily occur especially in female sterilisa-
tion operations where the fallopian tubes are surrounded by a 
number of similar structures. It is however difficult to see 
how any error on the part of the physician can be regarded as 
reasonable where the implications of failure are obvious and the 
damages so catastrophic. It can only be hoped that the Courts 
will regard a suricql error as somewhat more serious than the 
( 61) 
error of a lawyer. 
( 5 8) Roe v. M. 0. H. ( 19 5 4) 2 Q. B. 6 6 
(59) Randel v.Worsley (1969) 1 A.C. 191 (H.L.) 
(60) Smith v.Auckland Hospital Board (1965) N.Z.L.R.191,211 (C.A.) 
(61) c.f. note 59 
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It may be that the above difficulty can be avoided by 
regarding the doctor's mistake as a battery. It has been held in 
New Zealand that a battery may be committed either by intention or 
(62) 
negligence. However more recently the English Court of Appeal 
has held that a negligent battery must be judged in the same way 
(6 3 ) 
as any other negligent act. Such a limitation need not affect 
the plaintiff where, for example, the wrong fallopian tube is cut 
since although under a misapprehension as to which tube he was 
cutting the surgeon did in fact intend to cut the severed tube, 
and the plaintiff's consent only went to the correct tube. 
However the same problem arises as it did for 
"medical misadventure" under the Accident Compensation Act in 
that it is not the positive act of intentional severance that 
caused the pregnancy but the omission of not cutting the correct 
tube. Moreover damages in battery are limited to immediate 
injury and may not apply to consequential economic loss. Thus 
it seems unlikely that an analysis along the lines of battery is 
likely to be of any assistance. 
The fourth defence forms the conceptual background 
to "acceptable error" and is in fact the cornerstone of the 
physician's possible defence, whereby it must be shown:-
"*** that the course of action the doctor adopted is one 
which no professional man of ordinary skill would have 
taken if he had been acting with ordinary care. (64 ) 
Negligence cannot be established by the expert 
testimony of one of the defendant's colleagues who might have 
( 6 5) 
personallyadopted a higher standard. The test is conceptual 
( 6 2) Beals v . Hayward ( 19 6 0 ) NZ . L . R . 131 ( S . C ) 
(63)Letang v. Cooper(l965) 1 Q.B. 232 
(64)Ibid note 57 at 211 
(65)McLaren Maycroft & Co. v.Fletcher Development (1973)N.Z.L.R.100 (C.A.) 
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rather than pragmatic and just what is "reasonable practice" 
would appear to be determined by the Courts by inference. Thus 
the physician is insulated by the Courts in that he is to a 
certain extent judged on his own terms. 
Whilst there is some justification for attacking 
the "reasonable practice" rule at its conceptual base it may be 
that it will not be necessary to go that far for our purposes 
cince the most potent threat to recovery is the dependant 
defence of "reasonable error." It is submitted that "reasonable 
error" must be given a very limited application in this area of 
the law to where a surgeon is labouring under some hardship 
preventing him from exercising the standard of judgment that 
would normally be expected of him. It is further submitted that 
there is no room for such a wide defence in a kind of medical 
treatment where a very high standard of care can and should be 
expected. To allow such a defence would not encourage such a 
standard of care. 
Even were the defence to apply since it derives 
from the "reasonable practice'' rule it would appear that in order 
to displace the presumption of negligence the surgeon must 
affirmatively prove that he did everything that could have been 
expected of him. Thus the difficulties of proof in this type of 
action would appear to be as much of a two-edged sword as the 
benefit rule. 
CONCLUSION. 
Any recovery for the economic loss caused by the 
birth of an unwanted child is clearly beset by major difficulties, 
foremost among which is the benefit rule. It is submitted, 
however, that because avoidance of the benefit of birth can no 
longer be regarded as contrary to public policy and because of 
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the Court's implied recognition that childbirth does involve 
economic outlay, recovery is no longer fundamentally prevented. 
There is also the complication of the Accident 
Compensation Act whose machinery is inadequate to cope with 
the kind of loss for which recovery is sought but whose all-
embracing effect threatens to extinguish any real hope of sub-
stantial damages. Policy must surely militate against its 
application. 
The major hope for recovery must rest in the 
common law, but even the machinery of the Courts is somewhat 
stretched by the kind of recovery sought. It is clear that if 
there is recovery it must be primarily against the flexible 
background of the neighbour principle in tort. 
Finally there is the difficulty of proof which as a 
potent practical complication may well forestall any consideration 
of the legal issu3s at stake in otherwise deserving cases. 
The real justification for allowing recovery must 
rest in public policy from which the benefit rule is itself 
derived. To ignore the loss complained of would give rise to 
something of a paradox with the use of contraception on the 
one hand being encouraged while on the other hand a refusal to 
recognise, and provide compensation for, the very eventualities 
which the use of contraception served to prevent. In a world 
threatened by over-population it is more than ever necessary to 
recognise the importance of a uniform population policy. We 
cannot close our eyes to the ills contraception is used to cure. 
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